Introduction
The apparent 'denationalisation' 1 of electoral politics in a number of western democracies, and the decentralising reforms adopted by a number of these democracies in recent years (Jeffery 1997) , necessitate a reevaluation of our understanding of the way political parties organise and compete in the electoral arena. The view of party politics and party competition as essentially taking place at the national level between national parties over national issues appears increasingly inadequate to capture the dynamics of This article suggests how the territorial dimension might affect the way statewide parties organise, and offers a preliminary framework for orienting research into changing patterns of party organisation in a context of 'denationalised' party politics. To do so it draws on the experiences of territorial politics and the impact of decentralising institutional reforms in Western European democracies, and in particular in Britain, Italy and Spain.
Studying 'Denationalised' Party Politics: Concepts and Theories
The emergence of subnational or ethnoregionalist parties, and the challenges they pose to the existing order in centralised states, is one of the most striking trends in recent party politics in western Europe. However, it is not the only, or indeed necessarily the most important, aspect of the territorial dimension of party politics. Shifts in the territorial distribution of political power may have as much to do with politicians fighting for resources as with the politics of identity (Panebianco 1988) . The denationalisation of electoral politics can be driven by the changes in the strategies and support bases of statewide, 'national' parties, as well as by the emergence of rival parties at the subnational level (for instance in the case of the UK in the 1980s; see Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp 1988) . Moreover, although it is to be expected that decentralising reforms will lead to changes in the territorial nature of electoral politics, such changes can also result from institutional changes which have little to do with centre-periphery dynamics (such as some of administrative reforms carried out in 1990s Italy; see Dente 1997) .
Two features of 'denationalised' politics in particular have received insufficient attention in the literature. The first is the extent to which 'denationalised' party politics may be driven by factors other than ethnoregional cleavages, such as clientelism, or 3 simply the presence of powerful political figures at the subnational level (Tarrow 1977 ).
The second is the way in which statewide or national level political parties adapt to the electoral and political threat posed by ethnoregionalist parties, and the increasing importance of subnational and supranational electoral arenas (Roller and van Houten 2002) . Both are important in understanding the implications of an increasingly 'denationalised' party system, and the remainder of this article will focus on understanding the causes and consequences of the shifting organisational balance of power between centre and periphery in statewide political parties. Although this issue has not so far been widely studied, we do have appropriate theoretical and conceptual tools at our disposal. The extensive literature on political parties and party systems, while it has often neglected the territorial dimensions of party politics, can be readily adapted to the needs of research into 'denationalised' politics.
This analysis therefore draws on the existing literature on party organisation, and in particular the conceptual framework for the study of party organisations developed by Panebianco (1988) . Panebianco sees parties as organisations, rather than simply as parts of a party system, and therefore emphasises the internal dynamics which condition parties' ability to adapt in optimal ways to environmental changes. In particular, he places great emphasis on the concept of institutionalisation and the rigidities this imposes on party organisations, and stresses the effects of a party's origins on this process of institutionalisation (what current historical institutionalist work refers to as 'path dependency' [Steinmo and Thelen 1992] ). This perspective is important because it moves the analysis beyond a simple assessment, from the position of an external observer, of what it would be 'rational' for a party to do given a change in its environment, such as for example the emergence of an ethnoregionalist challenger party or the upheavals caused by a decentralising institutional reform. Instead it permits us to understand why parties will often have great difficulty in adapting successfully to such challenges, and why dramatic changes in electoral behaviour may occur as the process of 'denationalisation' gets underway. Finally, Panebianco provides a conceptual roadmap which is useful in reconstructing organisational dynamics; although now somewhat dated, the concepts he introduces (such as the emphasis on diverse incentives facing party actors, or the importance of political resources or control of 'zones of uncertainty' in the party organisation) can help map changes in parties' internal workings.
This emphasis on institutionalisation, and the increasing profile of institutionalist approaches which stress the 'stickiness' of political organisations, must be placed in the broad context of increasing electoral instability in western democracies. Extensive research in the 1980s in particular argued that the foundations of electoral stability in western democracies had been undermined by social change and that traditional parties were consequently weakened and vulnerable. This view was strongly challenged by Bartolini and Mair's analysis of long-term electoral change (1990) and by research on party organisations (Katz and Mair 1992, 1994) (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000) . Recent research on party memberships suggests that parties' organisational weakness and distance from civil society is increasing (Scarrow 2000, Mair and van Biezen 2001) , and in some countries has reached critical levels (Britain, France and Italy in particular). All this points towards a potential for significant party system realignments.
In some western democracies the destabilisation of party democracy has taken the form of a strong impetus towards the denationalisation of party politics, independently of institutional reforms in a decentralising direction. In fact, often the denationalisation of party politics is chronologically prior to institutional reform, rather than being a consequence of it. In Britain, the emergence of ethnoregionalist parties in Scotland and Wales, and the parallel growth of the centrist Liberal (now Liberal Democrat) party which has strong roots in the 'Celtic fringe', have seriously eroded the traditional two party system over the last three decades, laying the foundations for the devolution reforms set in train by the Blair government. In Italy, the emergence of a strong ethnoregionalist protest party, the Northern League, was a key factor in the implosion of the party system, and the principal reason for moves towards further decentralising reform in the present parliament (see Dente 1997) . In Spain, ethnoregionalist parties, already significant in the first post-Franco elections, grew strongly during the transition to democracy and played a role in the major realignment of the party system in 1982. In short, there is an important territorial dimension to processes of electoral change in western democracies which has not received sufficient attention in the scholarly debate.
This territorial dimension is key to understanding how political parties respond to emerging threats and challenges, in terms of both their electoral strategies and their internal organisation. The rest of this paper seeks to analyse changing forms of party competition, and in particular party organisation, from a territorial perspective.
Organising Parties in a Denationalising Political System
Although decentralising institutional reforms are often a consequence, as much as a cause, of changes in the territorial dimension of electoral politics, there is no doubt that a major source of party organisational change along the territorial dimension is institutional reform, such as the recent 'devolution' of powers in Britain or the creation of the 'Autonomous Communities' in post-Franco Spain. It is also the case that such reforms are not always welcomed by national-level party organisers, since 'severe functional or territorial changes dislocate the party organisation and upset channels of patronage' (Ashford 1982: 1-2) . Ashford argues that 'urging structural change is most often the argument of oppositions, more often than not because they see it as a way of increasing their power' (ibid), and recent examples from Western Europe seem to support this interpretation. The regional reforms in Italy (1970) and France (1980s) were the result of (statewide) left parties demanding reforms while in opposition, and implementing them after finally getting access to political power; in Spain (post-1978) and Britain (in the 1980s and 1990s) statewide left oppositions linked up with ethnoregionalist parties for the same purpose. Of course, when national-level party elites carry out decentralising reforms, they do so because they expect to benefit from them, territorial-based citizen-agent relationships' (Lancaster 1999: 64) , and the point is equally valid for unitary states where institutional or electoral change enhances the importance of the subnational level of party organisation. Where elections revolve around local-regional issues and voters consciously cast their votes for local-regional candidates (rather than voting for them as proxies of the national-level candidates), internal party dynamics will reflect this, and the balance of organisational power will shift from centre to periphery.
At the same time, the party's internal rules and structures tend to be 'sticky', and do not change at the same pace as the internal distribution of organisational resources. Instead, party rules and standard operating procedures may resist change for long periods, placing considerable pressure on internal coherence. The nature of complex patterns of organisational continuity and change can best be analysed by disaggregating different functions and arenas of internal party life, and looking at changes over time in these different arenas. Here three such arenas are considered: elite recruitment, party programmes and electoral campaigning, and the activities of the party in public office.
Political Recruitment
It has been long established in party organisational studies that one of the key arenas in internal party politics is the development of individual political careers (Michels 1962 , Wellhofer and Hennessey 1974 , Panebianco 1988 . Even if we discard the simplistic 'economistic' approach (that politicians are simply looking out for their own material interests), political careers remain important, since any politician hoping to push for the realisation of a political project must get his/her hands on the levers of power.
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Therefore one of the first areas in which centre-periphery tensions can be played out is in the process of political recruitment in general, and candidate selection in particular.
Candidate selection in western parties has undergone significant changes in recent years, with the increasing direct involvement of mass memberships in the process, through membership ballots and primary elections (Hazan and Pennings 2001) . However, outside the US these changes have not permitted candidate selection to escape the control of party elites, since the choice of potential candidates, and the ratification of the results of selection votes, tend to remain in the hands of party leaders (Hopkin 2001a ). The centre-periphery conflict is therefore likely to revolve principally around the formal control of the selection process and the ratification of candidacies, which subnational elites will attempt to wrest from the central level. However, the selection votes and primaries themselves are likely to become arenas in which this conflict will be played out, with subnational leaders using selection votes to rally local/regional support against The second important arena of conflict is the recruitment and career development of non-parliamentary party elites. One of the features of the emergence of 'cartel parties' (Katz and Mair 1995) is the use of state resources to consolidate party organisations, and the strengthening of parties' central offices and territorial bureaucracies with state funding. Although very often these structures are controlled by the parliamentary elites themselves (Mair 1994: 12-3) , there is a career structure in party bureaucracies which does not necessary involve election to public office. These bureaucracies have their own corporate interests and bureaucratic development has inherently centralising tendencies (Panebianco 1988: Ch.12 ). Blocking decentralising moves may be an important part of these bureaucrats' strategy for professional survival, and therefore the presence of a distinct bureaucratic structure may act as a force for internal organisational continuity.
Recent trends in party organisation have contradictory consequences for such dynamics.
On the one hand, the declining importance of traditional pyramidal party bureaucracies (in particular those characteristic of classic communist and labour parties) weakens this inertial effect. On the other, parties' increasing dependence on state funding, usually allocated in terms of national parliamentary representation and directly controlled by the national parliamentary leadership, may strengthen the centralising influence of parties' extraparliamentary organisations. The extent to which state party funding is decentralised (ie through allocations to party leaderships in subnational assemblies) is an important condition of party bureaucracies' ability to resist decentralising changes.
Programmes and Campaigning
Another important arena for internal conflict is electoral activity. The potential for centre-periphery tensions is strongly related to the extent of nationalisation or denationalisation of the electoral battle. To the extent that voters tend to see themselves as participating in a nationwide electoral event, casting votes for local candidates as 'proxies' for national party leaderships, the subnational level of party organisation will have little opportunity to push for a redistribution of internal authority. Party candidates will be expected to contest the election over national issues on the basis of a nationwide party programme. In this scenario, control over 'zones of uncertainty' (Panebianco 1988) such as campaign strategy, party discourse and programmatic proposals will be essentially in the hands of the central leadership and there will be little space for subnational party elites to develop a differentiated strategy. Party candidates will be 'delegates' of the national party leadership. This scenario is a fair reflection of the situation in the main British parties (Labour and Conservatives) before the recent devolutionary reforms.
Pressures for internal organisational changes are more likely to take place where subnational party elites gain some form of independent control of zones of uncertainty in the electoral arena. This may have nothing at all to do with ethnoregionalist pressures.
One example of a strong decentralising impulse is the situation in the Italian Christian
Democrat party (DC) before its electoral collapse in 1992-4. Here, ethnoregionalist claims were mostly absent (and when they emerged they had catastrophic consequences for the party), but many local elites had a great deal of (mostly informal) independence from central control. This independence had its roots in the historical weakness of the central state apparatus and its need to distribute favours to local notables in order to secure their adhesion (Tarrow 1977) . This meant that in areas such as the South and islands clientelistic tradition was strong, encouraging the parties of the post-war period to simply coopt local elites in these areas, rather than building autonomous party organisations. This was described as the 'Southern system', in which 'all parties are organised in the South and Islands on the basis of personal clientele (the politicians are local bosses using their parties as their own exclusive electoral machines)' (Allum 1973: 66) . These clienteles amounted to 'packages of votes' which local notables could control, and in theory, transfer from one party to the other in search of the best deal. In Spain, whose model of political decentralisation is also asymmetric (see returning more deputies to Madrid than their Catalan nationalist rivals, they have failed miserably in their attempts to take control of the Catalan administration (Ross 1996) . This is widely seen as the consequence of the PSC's perceived closeness to the PSOE, which allows the Catalan nationalist parties to represent the PSC as a party more concerned with the interests of Spain as a whole, and themselves as more concerned with the interests of Catalonia (see Caminal 1998) . As a result, there have been pressures from within the PSC to adopt a more independent line, which can be seen in part in the strategy adopted by the current PSC leader Pasqual Maragall, the former mayor of Barcelona (see Roller and van Houten 2002) 4 .
The evolution of all of these scenarios will be strongly conditioned by the parties' institutional inertia. Especially in 'old' parties where particular structures and rules may have been in place for a very long time, change may encounter serious obstacles. Internal reforms are likely to be path-dependent; breaking from long standing standard operating procedures may only be possible in the event of organisational 'catastrophies', such as large scale electoral losses, the discrediting of the party elite as a result of scandals, and significant policy failures (possibly all at once). Here, Panebianco's notion of the party 'genetic model' is helpful, as it allows us to map the consequences of party origins for their subsequent development. To this extent, decentralising reforms may be more likely 13 in cases of parties which were founded by 'diffusion' -the independent emergence of regional party organisations which subsequently unify -than in those founded by 'penetration' -the establishment of a territorial organisation from a strong central authority (Panebianco 1988) . In cases of diffusion, party organisational rules are much more likely to provide for subnational elites' influence over internal decision-making, whereas in cases of penetration, parties may be 'locked in' to a highly centralised form of decision-making, which may be hopelessly obsolete when party politics becomes denationalised. The Spanish case provides abundant evidence in support of this thesis.
The PP has its origins in a highly centralised and personalised party organisation (Manuel Fraga's Popular Alliance, AP), and this tradition has been exploited by Aznar in the 1990s to consolidate Madrid's dominant position. The Socialists, in contrast, adopted a quasi-federal structure during the post-Franco transition, with the autonomy of the PSC formally recognised in its statutes (Gillespie 1989) . In the 1990s, the Socialists have moved in a different direction to the PP, with the regional party federations acquiring an increasingly prominent role in the management of national party affairs.
Public Office: Executive and Legislative Action
The third arena I would like to examine is that of public office. Parties' activity in the executive and legislative institutions of the state involves them in various dilemmas relating to the internal balance between national and subnational party leadership. These In one sense, the question of coordination should not apply; where regional levels of government have been given independent powers, it is precisely to remove these same powers from the central government. In practice, however, it is broadly expected amongst western publics (with some exceptions, most notably the US [Donahue 1997] ) that parties should follow coherent policies at different institutional levels, or at the very least should not be on a collision course. The potential for regional-central conflict over policy divergence, and in particular over central-regional distributional issues, is ever present.
Subnational elites will naturally press for the maximum share of distributive benefits for their regions, and over issues of decentralisation vs. centralisation, subnational elites will naturally be inclined to press central government to release further powers to the regions.
The level of internal party conflict this provokes will depend on the extent to which subnational elites motivate regional sentiment, even ethnoregionalist sentiment, to achieve their objectives.
An area of great sensitivity in this context is the complementarity or otherwise of parliamentary strategy, in particular regarding the formation of governing coalitions.
Quite frequently in western Europe parties have been faced with uncomfortable situations in which they collaborate in governing coalitions with other parties at one level, and oppose the same parties at another. Establishing consistent rules for coalition formation within the national level party may be difficult if some subnational elites are expected to forego opportunities to govern at regional level for the sake of a party line they may not fully support. The potential for internal splits over such issues is considerable, and one of the key issues in the dilemma of national versus subnational control is that of coalition strategy. In the 1993-2000 period both major statewide Spanish parties faced, in turn, such dilemmas, as they were forced to form minority governments dependent on the support of ethnoregionalist parties. In 1993-6, the Spanish Socialist Party struck a deal with the Catalan nationalists in the Spanish Parliament, leaving the Catalan Socialists in the difficult situation of having to vote with their ethnoregionalist rivals in the national parliament whilst acting as the main opposition to them at regional level. In 1996-2000 it was the PP's turn to face this dilemma, although the relatively marginal position of the PP in Catalonia meant that less was at stake. In both cases, the central party leadership's priorities were imposed on the regional parties, indicating the primacy of statewide party competition within the party organisations.
Conclusions
This article has set out to trace a theoretical framework to organise research on the consequences for internal party dynamics of the 'denationalisation' of electoral politics, providing some examples for illustrative purposes. Rather than hypothesising particular directions of change, the aim has been to identify the organisational arenas in which internal party conflict is likely to take place, and to suggest how such conflict should be analysed. It has been argued that internal party dynamics produce outcomes which can only be fully understood if the organisational dimension of party behaviour is taken into consideration. The consequences for party politics of 'denationalising' trends in electoral behaviour and/or decentralising institutional reforms are rather unpredictable and mediated by the organisational dynamics of the parties themselves. Close attention will need to be paid to the ways in which party structures respond to the challenges they face if we are to make sense of the effects of institutional and electoral change on party competition.
The territorial dimension of party politics should be studied from a comparative perspective. The last two decades have provided an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the ways parties organise in western democracies, and although this literature has focused rather too little on the territorial dimension of party politics, it does provide the basic tools for such an analysis. We now know a good deal about the internal dynamics and decision-making processes of the principal western European parties, and can draw on this knowledge to assess how they might respond to denationalising trends.
This article constitutes a tentative first step towards a comparative analysis of party responses to decentralising reforms and the denationalisation of electoral politics in western democracies.
Notes
1 'Denationalisation' can be defined as a process by which electoral politics becomes less and less a national arena for party competition. It is therefore the inverse of the process of 'nationalisation' of electoral politics analysed by Caramani 1996 , and can be measured by assessing the degree of correlation between the distribution of the vote in different geographical areas of a given state at a given election. On the measurement of territorial homogeneity, see Rose and Irwin 1975 , Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996 , Caramani 2002 . 2 I owe this point to Andrés Rodríguez-Pose.
